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Abstract
In this paper, we ﬁrst give a direct proof of the existence of Edgeworth
equilibria for exchange economies with (possibly)unbounded below con-
sumption sets. The key assumption is that the individually rational utility
set is compact. It is worth noticing that the statement of this result and
its proof do not depend on the dimension or the particular structure of
the commodity space. In a second part of the paper, we give conditions
in order to decentralize Edgeworth allocations by continuous prices in a
ﬁnite dimensional and in an inﬁnite dimensional setting.
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11 Introduction
Since Hart (1974) [12], one knowsthat the exis tence of equilibrium in exchange
economies with unbounded below consumption sets requires some nonarbitrage
condition. For exchange economies consisting of a ﬁnite number of agents and
deﬁned on a ﬁnite dimensional commodity space, diﬀerent variants of such a
condition and diﬀerent conceptsof arbitrage have been formulated in [14], [21],
[13], [15], [16]. The relations between these conditions are studied in [7], [16],
[2]. All in turn imply the compactness of the individually rational utility set1
when the preferencesof agentsare derived from utility functions . The few papers
dealing with the equilibrium existence in an inﬁnite dimensional setting ([5], [4],
[6], [8]) assume the compactness of this set. Cheng [5],, Chichilnisky and Heal
[6], Dana et al. [8] give also suﬃcient conditions on the primitives of the economy
for thiscondition to be fulﬁlled.
Thisnonarbitrage condition isthe central as s umption of thispaper. In order
to model asset markets, we consider an exchange economy consisting of m agents,
deﬁned on a vector commodity space. Each agent is given with a (possibly un-
bounded below) consumption set, a utility function representing his preferences
on his consumption set, an initial endowment. Our ﬁrst concern is a direct proof
of the existence for such models of Edgeworth equilibria as classically deﬁned
by Aliprantiset al. [1]. Since the s et of attainable allocationsneedsnot be
bounded, thisexis tence cannot be deduced from Debreu and Scarf’stheorem or
its extensions to an inﬁnite dimensional setting ([1] and [10]). However, given
the nonarbitrage condition, this existence is guaranteed under mild assumptions
stated independently of the dimension of the commodity space or its particular
structure.
The proof of this result is based on an extension to fuzzy coalitions of Scarf’s
theorem on the nonemptiness of the core of a nontransferable utility game game.
The argumentsof thispreliminary res ult are ins pired by a nice paper of Vohra
[20]. The notion of balancedness for such a fuzzy game is borrowed from Floren-
zano [10]. The preliminary result is then applied to a proof (for any integer r)
of the nonemptiness of the core of a fuzzy game appropriately associated to the
r-replica of the exchange model. Finally, the existence of Edgeworth equilibria
is proved using the compactness of the individually rational utility set.
A direct proof of the existence of Edgeworth equilibria open a room for us-
ing core-equilibrium equivalence theoremsfor proving the exis tence of Walras
equilibria. The second part of the paper is devoted to some core-equilibrium
equivalence theoremsand to their cons equencesfor the exis tence of Walrasequi-
libria in asset market models.
1The individually rational utility set, sometimes simply called Utility set, is the set of utility
vectors in which every agent receives no less than the utility of his initial endowment and no
more than the utility of his consumption in a same attainable allocation.
2Recall that the purpose of core-equilibrium equivalence theorems is to show
that Edgeworth allocations can be supported as quasiequilibria by continuous
prices. While the Edgeworth equilibrium existence theorem does not depend
on the dimension and the structure of the commodity space, the techniques for
obtaining the decentralizing continuouspricesdiﬀer very much according to the
dimension of the commodity space. In the ﬁnite dimensional case, the decentral-
izing vector price isobtained asa tangent linear functional s upporting the s et
co(
 
i Γi) where Γi isthe s et of preferred net tradesof the ith consumer. The
same argument is working in an inﬁnite dimensional setting if the properties of
preferred sets allow to use Hahn-Banach’s theorem. In both cases, adding the as-
sumptions of the core-equivalence theorem to the assumptions of the Edgeworth
equilibrium existence result allow to extend most of known Walras equilibrium
existence results.
At the end of the paper, to go further, we assume a vector lattice commodity
space with a lattice ordered price space and propose to use a core-equilibrium
equivalence result established by Tourky [19] with in mind the possibility of
unbounded below consumption sets.
The paper isorganized asfollows : in Section 2, we prove the preliminary re-
sult. Section 3 contains the main result of the paper, the Edgeworth equilibrium
existence result for an economy with (possibly) unbounded below consumption
sets. Section 4 is devoted to decentralization results and to their consequences
for the existence of Walras equilibria.
2 Abstract
In this paper, we ﬁrst give a direct proof of the existence of Edgeworth equilibria
for exchange economies with (possibly) unbounded below consumption sets. The
key assumption is that the individually rational utility set is compact. It is
worth noticing that the statement of this result and its proof do not depend on
the dimension or the particular structure of the commodity space. In a second
part of the paper, we give conditionsfor decentralizing Edgeworth allocationsby
continuous prices in a ﬁnite dimensional and in an inﬁnite dimensional setting.
3 A preliminary nonemptiness theorem for the
core of a fuzzy game
Let M = {1,...,m} be a ﬁnite set of players and T =[ 0 ,1]m \{ 0}. An element
t ∈ T isinterpreted asa fuzzy coalition, that is, a vector t =( ti)m
i=1 of ratesof
participation to the coalition t for the diﬀerent players.
3We consider in this section m-person fuzzy games deﬁned by (T ,V) where T
isa ﬁnite subset of T containing ¯ 1=( 1 ,...,1) and the canonical base (ei)o fRm
and V : T→ Rm isa nonempty-valued corres pondence. For a fuzzy coalition
t ∈T, let usdenote
suppt = {i ∈ M | ti > 0}
the s et of agentswho participate in thiscoalition.
Deﬁnition 3.1 The fuzzy core of the m-person fuzzy game (T ,V) is the set
C(T ,V)={v ∈ V (¯ 1) |  ∃t ∈T and u ∈ V (t) s.t. vi <u i, ∀i ∈ suppt}.
Consider the following set
∆
T = {λ =( λt)t∈T | λt ≥ 0 and
 
t∈T
λtt = ¯ 1}.
It is easily seen that ∆T isnonempty.
Deﬁnition 3.2 A m-person fuzzy game (T ,V) is said to be balanced whenever
for every λ ∈ ∆T ,  
{t∈T |λt>0}
V (t) ⊂ V (¯ 1).
The following theorem extendsScarf’stheorem [17] ass tated by Aliprantiset al.
[1]. The ideas of the proof are due to R. Vohra [20] (see also Shapley and Vohra
[18]). Thiss ection isdevoted to itsproof.
Theorem 3.1 If T is as above and if (T ,V) is a balanced m-person fuzzy game
such that
a) each V (t) is closed,
b) each V (t) is comprehensive from below, i.e., u ≤ v and v ∈ V (t) imply
u ∈ V (t),
c) u ∈ Rm,v∈ V (t) and ui = vi ∀i ∈ suppt imply u ∈ V (t),
d) for each t ∈T there exists ct ∈ R, such that v ∈ V (t) implies vi ≤ ct for all
i ∈ suppt,
then
C(T ,V)  = ∅.
Proof. Each V (t) iscomprehens ive from below. So for each t ∈T, there exists
at ∈ Rm such that 0 ∈ int(at + V (t)). If a = ∨t∈T at, it isobviousthat a + V
satisﬁes the properties a), b), c), d) and that C(T ,a+V )=a+C(T ,V). Hence,
without loss of generality, we can (and we will) assume that 0 ∈ intV (t) for each
t ∈T.
4Next, ﬁx some constant c>0 such that for each t ∈T and each v ∈ V (t)w e






] −∞ ,c ]
m.
Clearly, the set W is closed, comprehensive from below and contains 0 in its
interior. Let ∂W denote the boundary of W.
Claim 3.1 If v ∈ ∂W ∩Rm
+ and vi =0for some i, then vj = c holds for some j.
Proof of Claim 3.1. To see this, assume that vi = 0 and vj <choldsfor each j.
Since 0 ∈ intV (ei), there exists some u ∈ V (ei) with 0 <u i <c . From Property
c), we see that the vector x deﬁned by xj = c for j  = i and xi = ui belongsto
V (ei) (and hence to W ∩ Rm
+) and satisﬁes v   x. Thisimplies v ∈ intW,a
contradiction.
Let ∆ be the unit-simplex of Rm.
Claim 3.2 For each s ∈ ∆, there exists a unique α>0 (depending on s) such
that αs ∈ ∂W ∩ Rm
+.
Proof of Claim 3.2. Let s ∈ ∆. We ﬁrst prove that there exists at most one α
such that αs ∈ ∂W ∩ Rm
+. Indeed, let αs and βs be elementsof ∂W ∩ Rm
+ such
that α>β>0. If si > 0 holdsfor each i, then αsi >β s i holdsfor each i and
so βs isan interior point of W, a contradiction. On the other hand, if si =0
holdsfor s ome i, then by Claim 3.1 there exists some j such that βsj = c and so
that αsj >c , a contradiction. Moreover, let α =su p {β | βs ∈ W ∩ Rm
+}. From
0 ∈ intW, we deduce that α>0. From the deﬁnition of W, we deduce that α
isﬁnite. Since, W isclos ed it followsthat αs ∈ ∂W ∩ Rm
+.
Thus, a function f :∆−→ ∂W ∩ Rm
+ can be deﬁned by formula
f(s)=αs where α =su p {β ∈ R+ | βs ∈ W ∩ R
m
+}.
Claim 3.3 f is continuous.
Proof of Claim 3.3. It suﬃces to show that f has a closed graph. Let us consider
a sequence (sn,f(sn)) in ∆×(∂W ∩Rm
+) that convergesto ( s,y). Write f(sn)=
αnsn ∈ ∂W ∩ Rm
+. Then αn =  αnsn 1 =  f(sn) 1 −→  y 1, and hence f(sn)=
αnsn −→  y 1s. By uniqueness of the limit y =  y 1s. Since ∂W ∩ Rm
+ isa
closed set, it follows from Claim 3.2 that f(s)=y. Consequently, f hasa clos ed
graph.




 t 1 | t ∈T and f(s) ∈ V (t)
 
5Claim 3.4 Ψ is nonempty-valued and has a closed graph.
Proof of Claim 3.4. Since f(s) ∈ W, it followsimmediately that Ψ( s)i sa
nonempty subset of ∆. Furthermore, let us assume sn → s, yn → y and
yn ∈ Ψ(sn). Since the range of Ψ is a ﬁnite set, there exists some n0 such that for




=y} V (t). Since {t ∈T | t
 t 1 = y} isa ﬁ-
nite set, passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that f(sn) ∈ V (t0)
for some t0 ∈{ t ∈T | t
 t 1 = y}. Since f iscontinuousand V (t0) is a closed set,
we deduce that f(s) ∈ V (t0) and consequently y ∈ Ψ(s).
Now we deﬁne the function g :∆× ∆ → ∆b y
gi(s,µ)=






where, asus ual, r+ = max{r,0} for each real number r.
Clearly, g isa continuousfunction. Finally, we cons ider the corres pondence
Φ:∆× ∆ → ∆ × ∆ deﬁned by
Φ(s,µ)={g(s,µ)}×coΨ(s).
Note that Φ isnonempty and convex-valued and hasa clos ed graph. Thusby
Kakutani’sﬁxed point theorem, Φ hasa ﬁxed point (¯s, ¯ µ). That is,
¯ s = g(¯ s, ¯ µ) and ¯ µ ∈ coΨ(¯ s).
In other words,
¯ si =




j=1(¯ µj − 1
m)+ ,i ∈ M (1)
and there exist T   ⊂T,( at)t∈T  ∈ RT , with at > 0 ∀t ∈T  and
 








,f (¯ s) ∈ V (t) ∀t ∈T
  (2)
Claim 3.5 . For all i ∈ M, ¯ µi = 1
m.
Proof of Claim 3.5: Suppose that it is not true. Recalling that ¯ µ ∈ ∆, it follows
from (1) that
 m
j=1(¯ µj − 1
m)+ > 0 Then, the sets









6are both nonempty. Indeed, from
 m
i=1(¯ µi− 1
m)+ > 0, it followsthat (¯ µi− 1
m)+ > 0
for some i. On the other hand, if ¯ µi > 1
m for each i, then
 m
i=1 ¯ µi > 1, a contra-
diction. Clearly, for all j ∈ J we have sj = 0 hence f(s)j = 0. From (2), for all
i ∈ I, there exists t ∈T  such that ti > 0, f(¯ s) ∈ V (t), hence f(¯ s)i <c , which,
together with J  = ∅, contradictsClaim 3.1.
Now, let uscons ider λ ∈ RT such that
λt =
  mat




t∈T λtt = ¯ 1, and therefore λ ∈ ∆T .
Claim 3.6 f(¯ s) ∈C (T ,V)






V (t) ⊂ V (¯ 1).
Hence f(¯ s) ∈ V (¯ 1). Suppose that there exists t ∈T and v ∈ V (t) such that
f(¯ s)i <v i for all i ∈ suppt. Let u be such that ui = vi for all i ∈ suppt and
ui = c otherwise. It follows from Property c) that u ∈ V (t) ⊂ W. But f(¯ s)   u
contradictsthe fact that f(¯ s) ∈ ∂W ∩ Rm
+. Therefore f(¯ s) ∈C (T ,V), which
endsthe proof of theorem 3.1.
4 Application to the existence of Edgeworth equi-
libria of an arbitrage-free exchange economy
4.1 Deﬁnitions
In order to apply the previoustheorem, we cons ider an exchange economy deﬁned
on a commodity vector space L and recall some deﬁnitions. M = {1,...,m} is
the set of consumers. Each consumer i is described by a consumption set Xi ⊂ L,
an initial endowment ei ∈ Xi, and a preference relation which isrepres ented by
a utility function ui : Xi → R. We normalize the utility functionsby requiring
ui(ei) = 0. To summarize, the economy E isa collection
E =( ( Xi,u i,e i)i∈M).
Let A(E) be the set of all attainable allocations of the economy E, that is:










7Let also M =2 M \ {∅} be the family of all coalitions of consumers. The al-









i∈S ei and such that ui(xi) <u i(x 
i) for
every i ∈ S. The core of the economy E, denoted by C(E), isdeﬁned asthe s et
of all allocations x ∈A (E) which are improved upon by no coalition. Finally,
following Aliprantiset al. [1], x ∈A (E) iss aid to be an Edgeworth equilibrium
if, for every integer r ≥ 1, the r-repetition of x belongsto the core of the r-fold
replica of E. We will denote by CE(E) the set of all Edgeworth equilibria of E.
For each integer r ≥ 1, us ing the notationsof the previouss ection, if
T
r = {t ∈ T | rti ∈{ 0,...,r}, ∀i ∈ M},
let usdeﬁne Cr(E) asthe s et of all attainable allocations x ∈A (E) such that
there exist no t ∈Tr and no xt ∈
 








tiei and ∀i ∈ suppt, ui(xi) <u i(x
t
i).
As it is easily seen and proved in Florenzano [10], under convexity assumptions
on preferences and consumption sets, CE(E)=
 
r≥1 Cr(E). In other words, CE(E)
isthe s et of all x ∈A (E) such that there exist no t =( ti)i∈M ∈ T, with rational
ratesof participation, and no xt ∈
 








tiei and ∀i ∈ suppt, ui(xi) <u i(x
t
i).
Following Aubin [3], the fuzzy core of the economy E, CF(E), isthe s et of all










tiei and ∀i ∈ suppt, ui(xi) <u i(x
t
i).
4.2 The existence result





+ |∃ x ∈A (E), s.t. 0 ≤ vi ≤ ui(xi), ∀i}
the individually rational utility set2.
We make on E the following assumptions:
[A.1] For each i, Xi isconvex;
2Recall that ui(ei)=0 ,i =1 ,...,m.
8[A.2] For each i, ui : Xi → R isquas i-concave;
[A.3] U(E) iscompact.






















t(E), s.t.0≤ vi ≤ ui(x
t
i), ∀i ∈ suppt}.
Finally, let
V (t)=( Ut − R
suppt
+ ) × R
M\suppt.
Proposition 4.1 Assume [A.1]–[A.3]. Then C(T r,V) is a nonempty subset of
U(E).
Proof. Since U(E) iscompact, there exis ts c>0 such that U(E) ⊂] −∞ ,c[m.
For each t ∈Tr, let usdeﬁne
V







We will keep in mind that V c(¯ 1) = V (¯ 1) = U(E) − Rm
+ and that for every i,
V c(ei)=V (ei)=−R+ × RM\{i}. We ﬁrst claim that the m-person fuzzy game
(T r,Vc) hasa nonempty fuzzy core, that is , C(T r,Vc)  = ∅.
Clearly, T r is a ﬁnite subset of T containing ¯ 1=( 1 ,...,1) and the canonical
base (ei)o fRm. The properties listed in Theorem 3.1 are also trivially satisﬁed.
It suﬃces to verify that the m-person fuzzy game (T r,Vc) isbalanced in the
sense of Deﬁnition 3.2.
To thisend, let λ ∈ ∆T r and v ∈
 
{t∈T r|λt>0} V c(t). For each integer n and for
every t ∈T r such that λt > 0, there exists xn,t ∈A t(E) such that ui(x
n,t
i ) ≥






, ∀i ∈ suppt. (3)











t∈T r λtt = ¯ 1, we have for each i ∈ M, xn





































9which shows that xn ∈A (E). Now, from relations(3) and in view of the deﬁnition






, ∀i ∈ M.
Since for every t ∈Tr such that λt > 0, ui(x
n,t
i ) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ suppt, we have also
(ui(xn
i ))i∈M ∈U (E). Passing to a subsequence if necessary, it follows from the




i ) ≤ ui(xi), ∀i ∈ M.
Hence v ∈ V (¯ 1) = V c(¯ 1), which shows that the game (T r,Vc) isbalanced. It
then followsfrom Theorem 3.1 that C(T r,Vc)  = ∅.
To end the proof, let v ∈C (T r,Vc). Note that v ∈ V c(¯ 1) = V (¯ 1) = U(E)−Rm
+.
Moreover, v ∈U(E). Indeed if not, for some i, {0}×RM\{i} ∈ V (ei) with 0 >v i.
We now prove by contraposition that v ∈C (T r,V). Let us assume on the
contrary that there exist t ∈T r and u ∈ V (t) such that vi <u i ∀i ∈ suppt.
Since vi <c∀i ∈ M, one can ﬁnd λ ∈]0,1[ such that
vi <λ v i +( 1− λ)ui < min{c,ui}∀ i ∈ suppt.
Hence (λvi +( 1− λ)ui)i∈suppt ∈ V c(t). We have got a contradiction.
Proposition 4.2 Assume [A.1]-[A.3] on E. Then
 
r≥1 C(T r,V)  = ∅.
Proof First, we show that C(T r,V) isclos ed. Let v = limn→+∞ vn with vn ∈
C(T r,V). Suppose that v  ∈ C(T r,V). Then there exists t ∈Tr and u ∈ V (t)
such that vi <u i ∀i ∈ suppt. But, for n large enough, we have vn
i <u i ∀i ∈
suppt, a contradiction. To end the proof, in view of the compactness of U(E),
it suﬃces to show that for each integer r ≥ 1w eh a v eC(T r+1,V) ⊂C (T r,V).
Let v ∈C (T r+1,V) and suppose that v/ ∈C (T r,V). Then there exists t ∈Tr
and u ∈ V (t) such that vi <u i ∀i ∈ suppt. Let uscons ider t  = r
r+1t. Clearly
At(E)=At(E), Ut = Ut, V (t)=V (t ). Since t  ∈Tr+1 and u ∈ V (t ), we have
got a contradiction.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.1 Under Assumptions [A.1]-[A.3], the set of Edgeworth equilibria
CE(E) is nonempty.
Proof Let v ∈
 
r≥1 C(T r,V) and x ∈A (E) be such that vi ≤ ui(xi) ∀i ∈ M.
We claim that x ∈C E(E). Indeed, if for some r, x/ ∈C r(E), then there exist
t ∈Tr and x  ∈A t(E) such that vi ≤ ui(xi) <u i(x 
i) for all i ∈ suppt. Hence
v/ ∈C (T r,V), a contradiction.
10Remark 4.1 Adding the assumption that the commodity space is ﬁnite dimen-
sional, the consumption sets are closed and the utility functions are upper semi-
continuous at every attainable consumption vector to the other assumptions of
Theorem 4.1, it would be easy to deduce its conclusion from Proposition 3 in
Florenzano [10]. The same proof3, under analogous topological assumptions (rel-
ative to the weak∗-topology on L), can be given if the commodity space is an
inﬁnite dimensional Banach space which has a predual. These two cases cover
most of commodity spaces of economic interest. However, it should be noticed
that the statement of Theorem 4.1 and its proof do not depend on the dimension
of the commodity space or on its particular structure.
Remark 4.2 As easily seen and proved in Florenzano [10], if the commodity
space L is a Hausdorﬀ topological vector space and if the utility functions are
lower semicontinuous at every attainable consumption vector, an Edgeworth
equilibrium whose existence is proved in Theorem 4.1 is actually an element
of the fuzzy core, CF(E), of the economy E.
5 Walras equilibria of an arbitrage-free exchange
economy
Recall that a couple (x,p) iss aid to be a quasiequilibrium of E iﬀ x ∈A (E), p is
a linear functional on L, with p  = 0 and
for every i ∈ M, p· xi = p · ei and ui(x
 
i) >u i(xi) ⇒ p · x
 
i ≥ p · xi.
A quasiequilibrium such that ui(x 
i) >u i(xi) actually implies p · x 
i >p· xi isa
Walras equilibrium. We will prove the existence of quasiequilibria by decentral-
izing Edgeworth equilibria obtained via Theorem 4.1.
5.1 Finite dimensional decentralization
Let us ﬁrst assume that the commodity space L is R , the l dimensional space.
For each xi ∈ Xi, we deﬁne the strictly preferred set to xi by
Pi(xi)={x
 
i ∈ Xi | ui(xi) <u i(x
 
i)}
and we set the two following assumptions:
3Truncating the economy by an increasing sequence of closed balls of L, centered at 0 and
containing all initial endowments, one obtains a sequence (xν
i )m
i=1 of Edgeworth equilibria of
the truncated economies. The sequence (ui(xν
i ))m
i=1 belongs to U(E)and has a converging
subsequence. At the limit, from the deﬁnition of U(E), one gets an allocation (xi)m
i=1. Using
the upper semicontinuity of functions ui, it is easily proved that this allocation is an Edgeworth
equilibrium of E.
11[A.4] For each i ∈ M, ui islower s emicontinuousat every attainable
consumption vector;
[A.5] If x ∈A (E) then for each i ∈ M, xi ∈ Pi(xi) (the closure of Pi(xi)).
Proposition 5.1 Under [A.1]-[A.5], the economy E =( ( Xi,u i,e i)i∈M) has a
quasiequilibrium.
Proof Let ¯ x ∈C E(E). In view of Assumption [A.5] , we have already remarked
that ¯ x ∈C F(E). Let G = co(
 
i∈M(Pi(¯ xi) − ei)). G isnonempty s ince x ∈A (E)
and the assumption [A.5] imply that Pi(¯ xi)  = ∅. We ﬁrst prove that 0 / ∈ G.












xi ∈ Pi(¯ xi), ∀i such that λi > 0.
Thusthe fuzzy coalition λimprove upon ¯ x, which contradicts¯x ∈C F(E).
Now, by the separation theorem for ﬁnite dimensional vector spaces, there
exists p ∈ R  \ 0 such that p · g ≥ 0, for all g ∈ G. From [A.5], one deducesthat




i∈M ei.T h u sp· ¯ xi = p·ei
for all i ∈ M and (¯ x,p) isa quas i-equilibrium of E.
Remark 5.1 In view of [A.5], assuming either that each ei ∈ intXi or that
e =
 
i∈M ei isan interior point of
 
i∈M Xi and that E satisﬁes some irreducibility
assumption, then (¯ x,p) isa Walrasequilibrium .
5.2 Inﬁnite dimensional decentralization
If the commodity space, L, is inﬁnite dimensional, let us ﬁrst assume that L is
a Hausdorﬀ topological vector space and that int(
 
i∈M(Pi(¯ xi) − ei))  = ∅. Using
Hahn-Banach’stheorem, we can mimic the proof of Propos ition 5.1 in order to
obtain:
Proposition 5.2 Under [A.1]-[A.5], the economy E =( ( Xi,u i,e i)i∈M) has a
quasiequilibrium. Under the same additional assumptions as in remark 5.1, this
quasiequilibrium is an equilibrium.
The previousres ult extendsthe res ultsof Cheng [5], Brown and Werner [4],
Theorem 1 of Dana et al.[8]. Actually, Brown and Werner, Dana et al. do not
assume [A.4] but prove only the existence of a quasiequilibrium.
12To go further, we now assume that L isa vector lattice with a topological
dual which is a sublattice of its order dual. We restrict ourselves in this last
part of the paper to the case of a noncompact attainable set, A(E). The reader
can ﬁnd a study of the case A(E) compact in Deghdak and Florenzano [9] for
consumption sets equal to the positive cone and in Florenzano and Marakulin
[11] for more general consumption sets (see also the references quoted in both
papers). Recall that e =
 
i∈M ei and that Pi(xi)={x 
i ∈ Xi | ui(xi) <u i(x 
i)}
deﬁnesa preference corres pondence (preference relation) Pi : Xi → Xi. The
following deﬁnition isborrowed from Tourky [19]:
Deﬁnition 5.1 A preference relation Pi is M-proper at xi if there are a convex
lattice Zxi and a convexset   Pi(xi) such that:
1.   Pi(xi)
 
Zxi = Pi(xi)
2. xi + e is an interior point of   Pi(xi) and Pi(xi) is open in Zxi
3. 0, ei ∈ Zxi and Zxi + L+ = Zxi
4. (1 + α)xi ∈ Zxi for some α>0.
Using Theorem 2.1 of Tourky [19], we obtain the following existence result:
Proposition 5.3 Assume [A.1]-[A.5] and that, in addition, e>0, each ui is
strictly increasing, each Pi is M-proper at every component of an attainable allo-
cation. Then E has a quasiequilibrium. Under the same additional assumptions
as in remark 5.1, this quasiequilibrium is a Walras equilibrium.
ThisWalrasequilibrium exis tence theorem hasno antecedent in the literature
on trade in ﬁnancial assets The economic meaning of M-properness is a purpose
for future work.
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